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SEARCHING FOR NARCOTICS IN SAN DIEGO:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM THE
SAN DIEGO SEARCH WARRANT PROJECT
LAURENCE A. BENNER & CHARLES T. SAMARKoS*

"Search Warants are so easy and they can't argue with you once you do them."
A Veteran San Diego Police Officer

INTRODUCTION
The right of all citizens to be secure in their homes against unreasonable
search and seizure is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States. Decisions by the United States Supreme
.

Laurence A. Benner is Professor of Law at California Western School of Law. Charles T.

Samarkos is ajuris doctorate candidate, 2000, at California Western School of Law.
The authors wish to thank the Honorable Wayne Peterson, Presiding Judge of the San
Diego Superior Court, Arnold Wmston, Deputy Administrator, Sharon Carow, Deputy Court

Administrator, and Fred Lear, Assistant Executive Officer for their cooperation and
assistance. We wish to pay special tribute to Mary Varon, Supervising Deputy, Criminal
Records, for maintaining such a well ordered record keeping system and for her generous
assistance throughout this project. We are also fortunate to have had the excellent assistance
of Michelle Waters who worked tirelessly in completing the data collection and data
processing phases; Allen D. Brown, who skillfully conducted the follow up docket study; and
Dr. Dennis P. Saccuzzo, who assisted us with chi-square analysis. Finally we owe a
tremendous debt of gratitude to Dr. Nancy E. Johnson, Director, Law and Psychology
Consortium, San Diego State University, who devoted countless hours inassisting us with our
research design and statistical analysis.
We dedicate this article to the memory of Kent Pedersen, who as former Assistant
Executive Officer, was instrumental in helping to make this study possible.
1. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. CoNST. amend. IV.The
Fourth Amendment was made applicable to the states. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is generally inadmissile in
state courts. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Court in the 1980s relaxed the standards for obtaining search warrants2 and
also created a "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule which is the
judicial mechanism for enforcing those standards.3 Such decisions gave rise
to concerns that the judiciary would no longer be an effective guardian of
Fourth Amendment rights.4 Subsequent studies documenting widespread

reliance by police upon secret "confidential" informants also raised fears that
government intrusions into the home could be based on information
provided by sources of doubtful reliability and integrity.5 Newspaper
headlines highlighting mistaken drug raids by armed police SWAT teams
which traumatized innocent families and even resulted in the deaths of
innocent citizens also lent credence to the fear that personal privacy and
security were becoming unintended casualties of the war on drugs. 6 After a
2. A search warrant is a written order signed by a magistrate, directed to a peace officer,
commanding him or her to search for and seize specified items listed in the warrant. See CAL.
Penal Code §1523 (West 2000).
3. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) the Supreme Court substituted a less rigorous
"totality of the circumstances" analysis for strict compliance with the two-pronged test
established in Aguilar v. Texas 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410 (1969). Under theAguilar-Spinellitest an informant's tip could not be used to establish
probable cause unless a factual showing was first made to establish: (1) that the informant
was credible and (2) that the informant had personal knowledge of the facts asserted or had
otherwise obtained their infonnation in a reliable way. In Spinelli, the Court had required
strict adherence to both prongs of the test. If either the credibility prong or the reliable basis
of knowledge prong was not satisfied, the tip could not be used to color otherwise innocent
conduct with suspicion. In Gates, however, the Court abandoned strict compliance with the
two prong test and upheld a search warrant based upon an anonymous tip. Although the
credibility of the tipster was unknowable, the Court found under a "totality of the
circumstances" approach that independent police investigation had corroborated the tip
sufficiently to establish probable cause. In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) and
Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984), the Court held that if police act in
reasonable reliance upon a search warrant, evidence obtained pursuant to that warrant will be
admissible despite the absence of probable cause or other technical defect in the warrant.
4. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 291 (Brennan, J. dissenting); see alsoPreface,Guidelinesfor
the Issuance ofSearch Warrants,American BarAssociation, Criminal Justice Section (1990).
5. See RicHARD VAN Duizm, L. PAUL Sin-roN & CHARLOTrEA. CARTER, THm SEARCH
WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONcEPnONS, PERcEnONs, PRACTIcEs,

30-35, 99-101 (1984)
[hereinafter THE SEARcH WARRANTPRocEss]; see also Clifford Zimmerman, Toward a New
Vision ofInformants: A History ofAbuses and Suggestionsfor Reform, 22 HASTNGS CONST.

L.Q. 81 (1994); Mark Curriden, The Informant Trap, First in a Series: Secret Threat to
Justice, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1995, at Al (reporting the dramatic rise in use of unidentified
informants).
6. See Joe Cantlupe, A Father'sFearsAbout Drugs andHis ChildrenAre Revealed, SAN
Dico UNioN TRmUNm, May 15, 1988, at A16 (reporting the killing of two people during
separate drug raids in March of 1988. One of the victims, shot and killed in his home in
southeast San Diego, was an innocent father whose son was suspected of selling drugs); Terry
L. Colvin & Graciela Sevilla, Mix-up: A Warranted Search?, SAN Dmwo UNIoN TRmuNE,

Oct 4, 1991, at Al (reporting drug mid on innocent family inNorth San Diego County); Ron
Sobel, Scott: Reclusive MllionaireKilled in Drug Raid that Came Up Empty, LA. TIMES,
Oct 12, 1992, at Al (reporting death of an innocent businessman, aged 61, shot by drug task
force members in his home in Malibu, California); Mark Curriden,Informer'sLies Triggera
Tragedy, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 6, 1.995, at Al (reporting $2.5 million settlement awarded to San
Diego businessman who was shot in his home in Poway, San Diego County, during a

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss2/3

2

Benner and Samarkos: Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: Preliminary Findings From t

2000]

SEARCHING FORNARCOTICS IN SAN DIEGO

bogus tip from an unreliable informant led to the unjustified shooting of a
Fortune 500 vice-president during the nighttime raid of his home in Poway,
a San Diego suburb, the use of confidential informants reportedly came
under stricter scrutiny in San Diego County.7
In order to assess the effect of the Supreme Court's relaxation of the
standards for determining the reliability of informants, evaluate how search
warrants were processed in San Diego County at the close of the twentieth
century, and provide a base line for future research, we embarked on an
extensive study of search warrants issued in San Diego County, known as
the San Diego Search Warrant Project. That research, which includes a
comparative study of search warrants issued prior to the Gates and Leon
decisions is still on-going. In this article we report our preliminary findings
with respect to one subset of that data - search warrants issued for narcotics.
This analysis is limited to search warrants issued in 1998 in the most urban
judicial district in San Diego County, the San Diego Judicial District.8
Overall this article reports findings which generally show San Diego
law enforcement in a favorable light. For example, our examination of
police affidavits, filed in support of the request for a search warrant, showed
that while police frequently utilized confidential informants and anonymous
tips, they also routinely took steps in those cases to corroborate the validity
of such tips. Our study also reveals, however, some surprising findings
concerning: (1) the extent to which "probable cause" in police affidavits is
based upon pre-packaged and computerized "boilerplate" rather than
concrete, narrative descriptions of fact; (2) the discovery that only a small
number of judges issue most of the search warrants (giving rise to the
appearance of what has been termed "judge shopping"); (3) the extent to
which there is racial disparity with respect to those targeted by search
warrants for narcotics; (4) the extent to which narcotics search warrants,
once issued, are not promptly executed; (5) the significant correlation
between failure rate and delay in execution of search warrants; (6) the extent
to which search warrants for narcotics are never executed; and (7) the
apparent under-utilization of existing statutory procedures for telephonic and
electronic search warrants. These preliminary findings thus raise a number
of questions which will require further research. We also conclude with a
caution that present trends we have observed may create conditions which in
the future could allow abuses to occur.

nighttime drug raid by U.S. Customs and Drug Enforcement Administration officers in
August of 1992); Dwight C. Daniels, Cops Terrfy Family in Case of Wrong I.D., SAN DmGo
UNION TRmuN, Aug. 11, 1994, at Al (reporting traumatizing after-effects of armed raid on

children of innocent couple).
7. See Curriden, supra note 6, at Al.
8. The San Diego Judicial District primarily encompasses the city of San Diego. This
article does not report on search warrants issued in the North County Judicial District, South
Bay Judicial District or El Cajon Judicial District.
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I. METHODOLOGY

Prior to formulating our research design we conducted a literature
review of previous search warrant studies, and examined relevant statutory
materials and case law qoveming the issuance of search warrants.9 The
Search Warrant Process, a comprehensive study of seven jurisdictions
conducted by the National Center for State Courts, in the early 1980s, was
extremely helpful in identifying the type of information which was available
and the problems we would likely encounter. We then familiarized ourselves
with how search warrant applications were processed, collected and filed in
the San Diego Judicial District. We obtained written procedures prepared by
the clerk's office, examined record keeping logs and determined that study
of a random sample of search warrants issued in 1998 would be appropriate.
The next stage entailed designing the Field Data Collection Instrument.
This Instrument was used to record information obtained by an examination
of each individual search warrant, the affidavit filed by the officer setting
forth probable cause for the search, and the Receipt & Inventory Form
listing the items seized. The initial design of this Instrument was further
refined after being field tested on a random sample of search warrants. It
collected data with respect to more than seventy-five variables concerning
the application process and the execution of each search warrant.
From the Search Warrant Log kept for the year 1998, we then selected
every odd-numbered search warrant issued between January 1, 1998 to June
1, 1998.11 If a search warrant selected to be in the sample was sealed or
otherwise not available, the next even numbered search warrant below the
selected number was substituted.12 In this manner 248 search warrants were
selected for study.' 3 Within this random sample, the primary target of the
search was narcotics in 122 (49.2%) cases. The characteristics of this
subset of warrants comprise the subject of this article. These search warrants
were sought by a variety of law enforcement agencies including the San
Diego Police Department, the San Diego County Sheriff's Department, the
U.S.Drug Enforcement Administration, the California Department of Justice,
and other municipal police departments within San Diego county.
9. See supranotes 3-5.
10. See THE SEARCH WARRANT PRocEss, supra note 5.
11. The January to June time period was also used by earlier researchers and found broad
enough "to reduce the possible biases of seasonal patterns of crime or criminal investigation."
THE SEARcHWARRANT PRocEss, supranote 5, at 7.

12. Eleven search warrants which would otherwise have been selected were found to be
sealed. This represented 4% of the total sample. It is of course not known whether any of
these sealed search warrants involved narcotics.
13. There were 953 search warants issued during the entire 1998 calendar year. Four
hundred and ninety-four (52%) were issued between January 1, 1998 and June 30, 1998.
14. The remaining search warrants sought records, fruits of crime, physical evidence for

forensic testing, weapons, instrumentalities of crime, or other items having evidentiary
significance.
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II. How SEARCHWARRANTS ARE OBTAINED

A police officer seeking a search warrant prepares an affidavit stating
the grounds (probable cause) for believing that contraband or evidence of
crime will be in the location to be searched. A search warrant is also
prepared according to a prescribed form, describing the place to be searched
and the items to be seized.16
Some seventy different officers and detectives were involved in
requesting search warrants. The highest number of search warrants sought
by any individual officer was six. Eleven officers obtained more than three
warrants during the six-month period covered by our random sample. While
police officers receive rudimentary training about when search warrants are
required at the Police Academy, learning how to prepare a proper affidavit is
not part of that basic curriculum.' 7
The lack of training for officers (other than detectives) is compensated
for, however, by assigning a Deputy District Attorney to serve as Legal
Advisor to the police department. This experienced attorney actively assists
officers in preparing the affidavit and search warrant and even assists
inexperienced officers in appearing before a judge. We found that 98.4% of
the search warrant affidavits in our sample indicated that a legal advisor had
reviewed the affidavit for legal sufficiency.
The affidavit and search warrant are then presented to a judge by the
requesting officer who signs the affidavit under oath. 8 If the judge approves
the search, he or she signs the affidavit indicating both the date and the time
that the affidavit was signed under oath by the requesting officer. The judge
then signs the search warrant indicating the date it was issued. The police
officer takes the signed search warrant and affidavit to the Clerk of the
Court, where the court's seal is placed over the judge's signature.19
15. In addition to the Fourth Amendment, the California Constitution also mandates that
a "warrant may not issue except on probable cause supported by oath or affinnation?' CAL.
CONST. art. 1 §13. The California Penal Code also provides: "A search warrant cannot be

issued but upon probable cause supported by affidavit, naming or describing the person to be
searched or searched for and particularly describing the property, thing or things and the place
to be searched." CAL. PENAL CODE §1525 (West 2000). The Code further provides that the
affidavit 'must set forth the facts tending to establish the grounds of the application, or
probable cause for believing they exist." CAL. PENAL CODE §1527 (West 2000).
16. See CAL. PENALCODE §1529 (West2000).
17. Interview with former San Diego Police Department training officer, February 17,

2000. Training courses on the particulars of search warrant preparation do exist, however, for
detectives who deal with search warrants on a more regular basis.

18. While the Fourth Amendment requires that no search warrant"shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or afflrmation . . ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV, the requesting
officer's oath does not mean that he or she has sworn to the truth of every factual allegation
asserted in the affidavit See infra text accompanying note 54.
19. The Clerk's office has detailed written procedures for the processing of the search

warrant and affidavit at this stage. These procedures are described inDesk Notes for Search
Warrants. The Clerk determines the next available number from the Search Warrant Log,
enters the search warrant in the Log and records the number on the original search warrant
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Special statutory provisions authorize and regulate the procedure for
obtaining search warrants by telephone or electronic mail.2° Only 11.5% of
the search warrants studied fell into this category which we have labeled

"telephonic warrants."
III. WHO ISSUES SEARCH WARRANTS
Over 95% of the search warrants were issued by judges of the San
Diego Municipal Court.2 ' Altogether twenty-four judges issued one or more
search warrants. As Table 1 reflects, however, there was a significant
disparity among judges in the distribution of this workload. Six judges
issued almost three-fourths (73%) of all search warrants in our random
sample.' Over one-third (3 8%) were issued by just three judges. The highest
number of search warrants issued by a single judge was twenty. Most judges
issued three or fewer warrants. We found that most warrants (86%) were
issued during regular working hours, between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. About
half were obtained in the afternoon, between 12:00 noon and 5:00 p.m.
Approximately 7% were issued between 5:01 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, and
7% were issued after midnight. Nine of the fourteen telephonic search
warrants were issued after 5:00 p.m.

and affidavit. The Clerk then makes certified copies of both the warrant and affidavit. The
original search warrant is returned to the officer along with a certified copy of the affidavit
The original affidavit and a certified copy of the search warrant are retained and filed in the
Clerk's safe. See Desk Notes for Search Warrants on file with the Supervising Deputy,
Criminal Records, San Diego Superior Court
20. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1526 (West 2000).
21. The remaining 5% were issued by Superior Court judges. As a result of unification
on January 1, 1999 the Municipal Court has now merged with the Superior Court so that the

distinction between Municipal and Superior Court judges is no longer relevant
22. Chi-square (df 23) = 174.262, p<.001; n=122. Chi-square is a method of analysis
within a class of statistical procedures known as non-parametric tests. A chi-square analysis
compares the observed, or actual frequency, to what would be expected based on a random
assignment For example, if 10 judges were available to issue 100 wanants, an expectation
based on random assignment would be that each judge would issue about 10 warrants. To the
extent that the actual, or observed number of warrants issued by the judges deviates from a
random assignment, the value of chi-square increases. The chi-square value is deemed
"significant," when the deviation from randomness is so great that one is justified in ruling
out the possibility that the deviation was due to chance. For example, where the probability of
obtaining a deviation from randomness exceeds five in 100 (i.e., p.<.05), it is accepted
practice in scientific research to assume that the results are not due to chance, but rather to
some systematic pattern of behavior. See Dennis P. SAccuzzo, PSYCHOLOGY: FROM
RESEARCH TO APPLICATIONS (1987). In the instant case, the value of chi-square was quite
significant: The probability that the results reported in Table 1 were due to chance was less
than 1 in 1,000.
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TABLE 1

Percent of Narcotics Search Warrants
Issued by Individual Judges

All Other Judges

udge,4

S27.0%

e 1 0'(
5

Juddg

Judge 8 -

Jk

-ug

From judicial and police interviews it appears that a combination of
factors contribute to the uneven distribution of the judicial workload
involved in reviewing and issuing search warrants. Although there is a
system for assigning judges on a rotating basis for after-hours search warrant
duty, any judge can in theory be approached during regular working hours.
One of the six judges who frequently issued search warrants believed that he
handled a high volume of search warrants because it was his policy never to
keep an officer waiting. If an officer needed a warrant and the judge was on
the bench, this judge indicated that the bailiff would swear the officer under
oath and take the affidavit and search warrant to the judge who would
review it while still presiding over court proceedings. 23 A veteran officer we
interviewed stated that the reason only a few judges tend to handle the lion's
share of the search warrant applications is because the officers go to those
judges who are experienced in criminal matters and are willing to make
themselves available to handle search warrants. This officer also candidly
admitted, however, that some judges were known for being liberal in

23. Interview with Judge #1 on March 9, 2000. As was the practice in the National

Center for State Court's study and in order to promote candor, we agreed not to identify
persons interviewed by name. See THE SEARCHWARRANT PRocEss, supranote 5.
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granting search warrants.24 We found that of the six judges who authorized
the bulk of the search warrants, five were former prosecutors?5s However,
one judge who ranked second highest in issuing narcotics search warrants
had no apparent 2prior criminal court experience, either as a prosecutor or a
defense counsel.2
IV. WHAT TYPE OF DRUGS ARE SOUGHT?
The drugs most frequently searched for were rock cocaine (35.2%) and
methamphetamine (31.1%). See Table 2. Only 4.9% of the warrants sought
powder cocaine. Heroin (7.4%) and marijuana (5.7%) were also sought
infrequently. Other drugs (3.3%) included LSD and prescription drugs.
TABLE 2 2

Type of Drugs Sought

24. Interview with veteran officer, February 17, 2000.
25. Based on examination of SoUrHnEN CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL PROFiES, Vol. 1 (1998).
See infra text following note 105 which reports that four out of five of these judges had good
success rates in recovering drugs when search wan-ants they issued were promptly executed.
26. See id. Two judges tied for second place in terms of the number of warrants issued.
27. Table 2 slightly underestimates the number of search warrants seeking a particular
drug, because it does not count search warrants which issued for multiple drugs. However, as
pointed out in the text, because search warants for multiple drugs were often based upon the
undifferentiated multi-drug response of a narcotics detector dog, which indicated the possible
presence of as many as five different drugs, reliance upon that data would have also skewed
the results. The data for single drug search warrants was therefore judged to be the most
representative.
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About 12% of the warrants sought more than one drug. However in twothirds of the multiple drug cases, probable cause for the warrant was based
upon the reaction of a narcotics detector dog. Affidavits in these cases
sought multiple drugs because the dogs are trained to alert to the presence of
several different drugs and their alert does not differentiate which one is
present. Table 2 compares the number of search warrants seeking only a
single drug.

V. WHAT PLACES ARE SEARCHED?
Table 3 reflects that the overwhelming majority of search warrants
(89%) were directed at private homes. In ten cases, the search warrant was
obtained to open a package. Search warrants were also obtained to search
luggage, a storage facility, motel rooms, and a detached garage. In well over
half of the cases (62.3%) the search warrant also authorized the search of a
named or described person if found on the premises. In eleven cases, the
search warrant for a home also sought to search an automobile. 8

VI. LOCATION OF HOMES SEARCHED
Table 4 displays the location of search warrants by zip code within the
San Diego Judicial District. The district is for the most part co-terminus with
the boundaries of the city of San Diego. As Table 4 reveals, the majority of
the narcotics search warrants were for locations clustered in zip code areas in
the southeast portion of the city.

28. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a search warrant is not

necessary to search or seize a car which is "readily mobile" if there is probable cause for the

search. See Pennsylvania v. Labron & Kilgore, 518 U.S. 938 (1996); Florida v. White, 526
U.S 559 (1999). While a distinction might have once been made between automobiles parked
in public and those found on private property, this distinction was apparently abolished in
Kilgore,which upheld a warentless search of a vehicle parked at the rear of a farm house. It
should be noted that the searches involving cars in our sample were searches also involving
the home. No search warrant was obtained exclusively to search only an automobile. It may
that where police are aware of a specific car, it is included in the search warrant because
under the Leon good faith exception any evidence will be admissible even if it later turns out
there was no probable cause for the search. See U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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TABLE 3

What Place is Searched?
Other
Home, Person and Car

~Home

Home&Car

Package

54.9%
Home & Person

VII. WHO IS SEARCHED?
Where the search warrant authorized the search of a person who owned
or controlled the premises to be searched, a description of the race and
gender of that person was given. It was therefore possible to collect this
information for 74.6% of the cases. As reported below, we found that the
majority of these search warrants were served on Black and Hispanic
residences. The judicial district from which our sample was drawn includes
San Diego's inner city, which demographically comprises significant Black
and Hispanic populations. That judicial district also includes many areas
which are predominately White. Several factors have been suggested which
may have had an influence in causing this disparate impact in terms of race.
For example, it has been suggested that because police resources are
concentrated in high crime areas, which tend to have large minority
populations, this naturally leads to more information becoming available
about illegal drug activities in those neighborhoods and thus more searches
in those areas. The heavy reliance upon confidential informants, reported
infra, also may play a role in determining where searches will be carried out.
Finally, as reported below, we found that there were racial differences
between the two major drugs sought: methamphetamine and rock cocaine.
When examining only search warrants for methamphetamine, for example,
we found that substantially more White residences were searched than Black
residences. The reverse was true with respect to rock cocaine.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol36/iss2/3
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TABLE 4DISTRIBUTION OF SEARCH WARRANTS
WITHIN THE SAN DIEGO MUNICIPAL JUDICIAL DISTRICT
JANUARY 1 TO JUNE 30, 1998

29. Warrants to search packages and search wanants issued for areas outside the San
Diego Municipal Judicial District were excluded from the table. N = 95.
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Table 5 reflects the racial characteristics of the subjects of the search
warrants in our sample. Since drug use is not the exclusive province of any
racial group, it might be expected that the race of the targets of search
warrants would model their proportion of the population of the city of San
Diego. 30 This did not turn out to be the case. While approximately 56% of
the population of the city of San Diego was White at the time of these
searches, only 14% of the search warrants in our sample targeted White
suspects.31 While 23% of the population was Hispanic, 36% of the search
warrants involved Hispanic suspects. While only 9% of the population was
Black, 24% of the search warrants involved Black suspects.32 By contrast
while 13% of the population was Asian, only one search warrant involved an
Asian suspect. 33 Even if the subjects of search warrants for whom race was
unknown (25%) were all assumed to be White, and were added to the White
total, the majority of the search warrants (61%) would still involve nonwhite suspects.
TABLE 5

Race of Target of Search

Hispanli

30. The San Diego Judicial District, from which our sample was drawn, is for the most
part congruent with the boundaries of the city of San Diego.
31. See San Diego Population by Ethnicity, 1996, (visited on Feb. 14, 2000)
<http://www.sddt com/features/statsheets/sdstatsbigpicture/populationlethnicity.html>.
32. See id.
33. See id.
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This data suggests that Black San Diegans are thus about four times
more likely to be the subject of a search warrant for narcotics than Whites.
Members of the Hispanic community are about twice as likely as Whites to
experience such a search. 34 When one controls for the type of drug sought,
however, a slightly different perspective emerges. Half of the search
warrants for methamphetamine, for example, targeted White suspects, while
79% of the search warrants for rock cocaine targeted Black and Hispanic
suspects. Data from the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring program (ADAM)
conducted by the San Diego Association of Governments in 1998, the same
year as our sample, suggests that this difference results from the fact that the
different ethnic groups have different drug use patterns. Comparing our data
and the data collected by ADAM we found that that search warrants for
methamphetamine were sought in roughly the same proportion as admitted
drug use by particular racial groups. ADAM reported that 46% of adult
White arrestees tested positive for methamphetamine use. This was more

often than either adult Black or Hispanic arrestees. Only 12% of adult Black
arrestees tested positive for methamphetamine while 34% of adult Hispanic
arrestees tested positive. 5 In a special study of methamphetamine users
34. Using statistical methodology developed by Dr. John Lamberth of Temple University
and reported in David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statisticsand the Law: Why "DrivingWhile
Black" Matters, 84 INN. L. REv. 265, n.63 and n.103 (1999), the likelihood ratio is
calculated as follows: (1)Calculate the ratio of Blacks searched to Blacks in the population
subject to search. (2) Calculate the ratio of Whites searched to Whites in the population
subject to search. (3) Divide the first number by the second number. Thus the ratio of Blacks
searched to Blacks in the city of San Diego was 238-.09=2.644. To determine the ratio of
Whites searched we assumed that all cases in which race was unknown involved White
suspects. Thus .14 (actualpercent searched-which were White) + .234 (percent race unknown,
but assumed White) =.393 -.56 =.702. Then 2.644 -.702 = a likelihood ratio of 3.766. The
calculation for Hispanics is as follows: .361+.23=1.570+.702 = likelihood ratio of 2.236. In
view of our assumption that all cases where race was unknown involved White suspects, the
ratios we derived represent an extremely conservative figure.
For other studies on the relationship between race and law enforcement see CHARLEs J.
OGLETREE, JR. MARY PRossER, ABBE Siff.Im & WILuIA

TALLEY, JR., BEYOND THE RODNEY

KING STORY: AN INVESTIGATION OF POLICE CONDUCT INMINORITY COImUNRITIES (1995);
David A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and PoorMeans Stopped
andFrisked,69 IND. L. J. 659 (1994); Randall Kennedy, The State, CriminalLaw, and Racial
Discrimination:A Comment, 107 HARv. L. Ra. 1255 (1994); Elizabeth A. Gaynes, The
Urban Criminal Justice System: Where Young + Black + Male = Probable Cause, 20
FORnDAm U". L. J. 621 (1993); Tracey Maclin, Black and Blue Encounters: Some
PreliminaryThoughts aboutFourthAmendment Seizures: Should Race Matter, 26 VAL. U. L.
REv. 243 (1991); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1988). See also John Gibeaut, Profiling:Marked for Humiliation,
A.B.A. JoURNAL, Feb. 1999, at 46-7 (reporting that 60% of the 1772 airline passengers
subjected to strip searches by U.S. Customs officials in 1997 were Black or Hispanic while
these groups may make up less than 5% of the traveling public).
35. See Joe Ellett& Susan PennellADA.. Arrestee DrugAbuse Monitoring,1998, San
Diego Association of Governments, April 1999 ("ADAM") p. 26, TIbl. 6. This study was
based upon a sample of 384 White, 238 Black and 247 HIspanic adult arrestees who
voluntarily participated in confidential interviews and testing at the downtown Central Jail or
the women's facility at Las Colinas. This study showed considerable differences between
ethnie groups in drug use patterns. While methamphetamine use, as reported above, was most
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during the period 1996-98, reflected in Table 6 below, it was also reported
that Whites participated in illegal drug trafficking activities involving
methamphetamine far more than either Blacks or Hispanics.36

TABLE 6

:.

Arrestee Participation in Methampheamine Trafficking Activities During 19964999
White
58%
Black
10%
Hispanic
29%
Table 7 compares the race of the target of a search warrant with the type
of drug sought. Race was known for 54% of the search warrants issued for
methamphetamine ('meth"). We found that White residences were subject to
search warrants for meth far more often than Black residences. While 50%
of meth warrants targeted White residences, only 7% targeted Black
residences. Search wa-rants for meth thus appear to have targeted Blacks and
Whites in roughly the same proportion as their reported drug use. This data
also reflects roughly the same proportion as that shown in Table 6 and
suggests that search warrants for meth were targeted in terms of race in
about the same proportion as both racial groups were reported to have
engaged in distribution activities involving meth during the same period.
Conducting the same type of comparative analysis for Hispanics
produces somewhat mixed results. The proportion of search warrants for
meth which involved a Hispanic subject is roughly comparable to the
reported drug use by this group. Thirty-four percent of adult Hispanic
arrestees reported meth use in 1998. In 39.3% of the search warrants for
meth, the subject was Hispanic. This produces a likelihood ratio of 1.35. If
one constructs a likelihood ratio for Hispanics based upon reported drug
distribution activities, however, it appears Hispanics are about one-and-ahalf times more likely than Whites to be the subject of a search warrant for
meth. (The calculation is as follows: 29% of adult Hispanic arrestees
admitted meth distribution activities. Thus .393+.29 = 1.36 + (50% Whites
searched + 58% Whites distribute = .86) = likelihood ration of 1.58).

frequently a White phenomenon, 45% of adult Black arrestees tested positive for cocaine;
more than either White (9%) or Hispanic (13%) arrestees. Twelve percent of adult Hispanic

arrestees tested positive for heroin, as compared to 9% for Whites and 5% for Blacks. The

study also found only 3% of Black juvenile arrestees (age 18 and under) tested positive for
methamphetamine, while Hispanic juvenile arrestees had a slightly higher rate of
methamphetamine use (16% tested positive) than White juvenile arrestees (14% tested
positive). See id.at 31, tbl. 11.

36. See id. at 49, tbl. 23. Table 6 reflects the percent of arrestees who admitted in
confidential interviews that they participated in drug distribution activities. It excludes
arrestees for whom race was recorded as "other" (3%).
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Drug
Meth
Rock Cocaine
Powder Cocaine
Heroin
Marijuana
Other Drug
TOTAL
Does not represent

TABLE 7s
Drug Sought by Race of Target
Number of Search Warrants Issued
White Black Hispanic [Asian Unknown
24
1
11
14
2
11
22
0
23
1
14
4
0
0
2
11
0
9
2
1
14
5
0
0
2
0
2
0
1
2
76*
29*
51*
1*
21*
num ersue

Total
52
57
20
23
21
5
178*

y race.

As Table 7 reveals, racial disparity also appears in search warrants for
cocaine. For example, in those cases where race was known, all but one of
the warrants seeking rock cocaine were directed at Black and Hispanic
subjects. However, the 1998 ADAM report showed that drug testing of
arrestees indicated that 45% of Black adult arrestees tested positive for
cocaine use, as opposed to only 9% for Whites and 13% for Hispanics.3 7 The
ADAM statistics thus indicate that search warrants for rock cocaine targeted
Black suspects in the same proportion as that group's reported involvement
in use of that drug. (44% of search warrants for rock cocaine involved Black
suspects, while ADAM reported 45% of Black arrestees tested positive for
cocaine.) However, by the same analysis it appears that Hispanics were three
times more likely to be the subject of a search warrant for rock cocaine as
Blacks, the group most frequently using that drug. (Only 13% of adult
Hispanic arrestees tested positive for cocaine, while 42% of the search
warrants for cocaine involved an Hispanic suspect. Thus the likelihood ratio
is calculated as: .42 - .13 = 3.23 - (.44 +.45 = .98 ratio for Blacks) = 3.30).
Obviously, in this report of our preliminary findings, we have only
begun to scratch the surface with respect to this issue. Further research needs
to be undertaken, for example, to understand why rock cocaine was sought
so frequently while powder cocaine, reportedly used by Whites, was sought
so infrequently. See Table 2, supra. Using the ADAM arrestee data for
purposes of comparison may also be problematic. It may be that white
middle class cocaine users living in bedroom communities are simply not
arrested in the same proportion as Black cocaine users living in the inner
37. The total (178) exceeds the number of search warrants issued because a number of

search wan-ants sought more than one drug. See discussion of drug detector dogs, supran 27.
The table thus does not necessarily reflect the total number of warrants issued by race.
38. See id. at 26, tbl. 6. The ADAM report did not differentiate between powder cocaine
and rock cocaine. Rock cocaine is also referred to as coke base. The ADAM report also did
not do a comparable report during the relevant time period on the racial characteristics of San
Diego arrestees who engaged in rock cocaine distribution activities.
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city. Other studies have indicated that overall drug use by Blacks and
Whites is roughly
the same as the presence of each group in the population
39
as a whole.
We note that the San Diego Police Department is a nationally
recognized leader in community policing, which seeks to involve the
community and employs proactive problem solving approaches to the crime
problem. We note also that both the current and immediate past Chiefs of
Police have undertaken initiatives to combat racial profiling. Nevertheless
the undeniable impact which race has upon the overall distribution of search
warrants is perplexing and demands further attention and research.
VIII. GENDER
We were also able to determine the gender of 93.4% of the targets of the
search warrants in our sample. Over half (58%) of these gender identified
search warrants targeted men. One in four targeted women and 10% targeted
both men and women. Table 8 compares gender of the target with the type of
drug sought and shows women were more likely to be targets of search
warrants involving methamphetamine and cocaine than marijuana or heroin.
TABLE 8
Drug Sought by Gender of Target
Number of Search Warrants Issued
Women Both Sexes Unknown
Drug
Men
7
15
5
Meth
25
5
13
6
Cocaine
33
Rock
6
2
5
7
Powder Cocaine
5
5
12
1
Heroin
5
5
9
2
Marijuana
0
2
2
1
Other Drug
28
35*
27
88*
TOTAL
* Does not represent the total number of warrants issued by gender. See note 37

Total
52
57
20
23
21
5
178

IX. SOURCES OF PROBABLE CAUSE
The affidavit supporting the application for a search warrant for
narcotics must set forth facts which establish reasonable grounds to believe
that specified narcotics will be found in the particular place to be searched. 4°

39. See Harris,supra, note 34 at 296-97.
40. See CAL.

PENAL CODE §§

1525 and 1527 (West 2000). This is known as the

"probable cause" requirement. The United States Supreme Court has held that in order to be a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, probable cause cannot be based upon bare
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The information upon which probable cause is based must also be shown to
be reasonably trustworthy. Where the affidavit contains information based
upon the officer's own personal knowledge, the trustworthiness of the
information upon which probable cause is based is rarely an issue. The oath
required by the affidavit serves as a guarantee of truthfulness of the source
of the information. 42 Because the information is based upon the personal
observations of a trained police officer, it is likewise reasonable for the
judge to conclude that the information is reliable. Where the information
establishing probable comes from sources other than the officer swearing out
the affidavit, however, issues can arise concerning the credibility of the
source of the information. Likewise, even if the source is shown generally to
be a truthful person, issues can arise concerning whether the informant
acquired his information in a reliable manner. Because of these concerns the
Supreme Court at one time required that information provided by informants
strictly comply with a two pronged test.4 3 This test required that a showing
be made as to the informant's credibility and that it also appear that the
informant had obtained his information in a reliable way. In Illinois v.
Gates,44 the Supreme Court abandoned rigid adherence to this two-pronged
test in favor of a more general approach which determined probable cause
based upon the "totality of the circumstances." 45 The Court acknowledged,
however, that both prongs of the analysis are still "highly relevant" factors in
assessing an informant's tip.a6 Table 9 shows the extent to which various
sources, other than regular law enforcement officers, were involved in
providing information establishing probable cause.47

conclusions of the officer. Instead, the affidavit must state facts upon which the judge can
make the determination of probable cause. See Aguilar v. Texas 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
41. The classic definition ofprobable cause was stated by the Supreme Court as follows:
"Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge
and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to

warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being

committed." Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). The Court has subsequently referred to the quantum of

suspicion sufficient to establish probable cause as a "substantial chance" or a "fair

probability." liinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238, n.13, 243 (1983).

42. But see Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishing the procedure for
challenging the truthfulness of factual statements in an affidavit for a search warrant).
43. See supranote 3.
44. Gates, 462 U.S. 213.
45. Id. at 238.
46. Id. at 230.
47. Table 9 reflects the total number of cases in which a particular source, outside

ordinary law enforcement, provided information relevant to probable cause. It therefore

includes cases in which the source was the exclusive source of probable cause and cases in
which the source was one of several sources of information.
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TABLE 9

Major Sources of Probable Cause

Crime Victim
Criminal
Ordinary
CitizenTi

Anonymous3%

7%

Ionformnt$
64%

While almost all affidavits in our sample reflected some observation
made by the attesting officer, probable cause was based solely upon
observations by law enforcement in only 21.3% of the search warrant
applications. In 41% of the cases there were multiple sources of information.
In more than one of out three cases (37.7%) probable cause was based on a
single source other than law enforcement. As Table 9 indicates, almost one
quarter of the search warrant applications involved an anonymous tip. Sixtyfour percent of the cases involved a confidential informant ("CIr).4 Other
sources of information included ordinary citizens (7%), criminal
informants49(3%) and crime victims (2%).
48. Also referred to as "confidential source," the "Cr' is an informant who is known to
the police but is not identified by either name, status or description in the affidavit

49. A criminal informant is a person who has been arrested for a crime and provides
information to police usually in an effort to obtain some benefit for himself. Only four cases
involved a criminal informant In several cases subjects arrested with drugs on them told
police where they had purchased the drugs. In one case, a prostitute was arrested by a
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X. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

Almost two-thirds (63.9%) of the affidavits we examined contained
information provided by an unnamed and unidentified informant. In over
one-third of the cases (36.1%) probable cause was based primarily upon the
C's information and related law enforcement information about the CI and
the C's activities. In the overwhelming number of affidavits examined
(95%) the reason given for not revealing the name of the informant was a
standard boilerplate paragraph. The following paragraph is typical:
I desire to keep said informant anonymous because CI has requested me to
do so, and because it is my experience that informants suffer physical,
social and emotional retribution when their identities are revealed, because
it is my experience that to reveal the identity of such informants seriously
impairs their utility to law enforcement, and because it is my experience
that revealing such informants identities prevents other citizens from
disclosing confidential information about criminal activities to law
enforcement officers.
As is readily apparent this boilerplate language contains no factual
statements relating to any circumstances surrounding the informant in the
case at hand. Indeed there is only a universal blanket conclusion based upon
the officer's experience, unsupported by any factual statement showing that
the case at hand comes within that experience. A public entity is granted a
privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of an informant only if the public
interest requires it because the "necessity for preserving the confidentiality
of [the informant's identity] outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the
interests of justice. '5 As a result of this privilege portions of an affidavit
may be sealed by judicial order in order to prevent exposure of the C's
identity. 51 The use of boilerplate in the manner described above, however,
bypasses this entire process and indeed denies judges the very information
neighborhood policing team and gave the officers information about a person selling drugs. A
controlled buy was conducted to corroborate this information and a telephonic wan-ant
obtained which was immediately executed and a successful recovery of drugs made.
50. Although CAL.PENaL CODE § 1534(a) (West 2000) provides that a search warrant
and its supporting affidavit become a public record after the warrant has been executed, the
California Evidence Code gives a public entity a privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of
an informant who has given a law enforcement officer information about a violation of law, if
"there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of his identity that outweighs the
necessity for disclosure in the interests of justice.' Ca.. EvD. CODE § 1041 (West 2000). The
Evidence Code also provides that where a search warrant is valid on its face, a "public entity
bringing a criminal proceeding is not required to reveal to the defendant official information
or the identity of an informer in order to establish the legality of the search."CaL. EviD.
CODE § 1042(b) (West 2000).
51. See People v. Hobbs, 7 Cal. 4th 948 (1994).
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they would be required to have in order to make a determination that the
C's identity should not be revealed. 52
Typically the affidavit stated how long law enforcement personnel had
known the confidential informant. The time period ranged from as little as
two weeks to as many as eight years. In ten percent of the affidavits the
extent of contact with the informant was not provided. The most frequent
time period given was one year. Tables 10 and 11 reflect the length of time
C's were known to law enforcement personnel before the date of the
affidavit.
TABLE 10
Length of Time Confidential Informant
Known by Law Enforcement

aN

1

Not Given

4

8

20

30

52

108

208

Length of Time CI Known by Officer (inweeks)

52. This practice would also appear to short-circuit the practice recently outlined by the
California Supreme Court in People v. Hobbs, to "compel [law] enforcement officers to
respect the constitutional security of all of us under the Fourth Amendment" Id. at 968. In
Hobbs, the California Supreme Court recognized that if, as a result of sealing the affidavit, the
defendant is unable to challenge the truthfulness of facts stated in the affidavit "or otherwise
make an informed determination whether sufficient probable cause existed for the search" the
trial judge is required to conduct an in camera hearing. Id. at 972. At this hearing the court
stated: "It must first be determined whether sufficient grounds exists for maintaining the
confidentiality of the informant's identity. It should then be determined whether the ... extent
of the sealing is necessary to avoid revealing the informant's identity." Id. This requires an
individualized case by case determination. In light of Hobbs, it is difficult to understand how
blanket non-disclosure of a CI's identity can be proper without supplying any particularized
factual basis for non-disclosure to the issuing magistrate in the first place.
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TABLE 11
Tune Known in Months
10%
Not Given
Less than 6 months
35%
29.5%
6 months to I year
Over 1 year
24.5%
n=78
A. PHANTOMAFFIDAVITS
We discovered that in half of the affidavits in our sample, the
confidential informant was not personally known to the officer making the
affidavit under oath. Rather, the officer simply related information given to
him by another officer who did not join in signing the affidavit. Thus,
Officer A swears under oath that Officer B told him that there was a CI who
gave him certain information. This practice results in no officer ever having
to state under oath that a CI even existed. As other researchers have
recognized, this seems to be an anomaly since the Fourth Amendment
literally requires that "No Warrant shall issue but upon Probable Cause
supported by Oath or Affirmation. ' '53 If the officer making the affidavit only
relates what another officer told him regarding the CI's observations and
those observations are essential for probable cause to exist, then it is hard to
see how the Fourth Amendment's oath rquirement is being complied with.
Nevertheless the practice has been upheld without apparent recognition of
the anomaly. 54 While we do not mean to suggest that law enforcement
officers are making up fictitious CIs and insulating the search warrant
affiant from possible perjury charges by this practice, the potential for such
abuse is apparent. The minor inconvenience of having the officer with first
hand information give a telephonic affidavit to the judge, as specifically
provided for by §1526(b)(1) of the California Penal Code, would at least
insure that the search warrant process is not based upon blind trust.
B. TRACK RECORD OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS
In order to establish a track record of reliability for the CI, an affidavit
also routinely reported that the CI had furnished information leading to a
specified number of arrests in the past. In 29% of the cases no prior arrests
were indicated. Table 12 reflects the number of arrests reported, which
ranged from as few as two to as many as fifty.
53. U.S. CONST. Amendment IV; see also, Tim SEARCH WARANrr PROCESS, supra note
5, at 55-6.
54. See People v. Senkir, 26 Cal. App. 3d 411 (1972). The United States Supreme Court
has also ruled that probable cause can be based upon hearsay. See Draper v. Illinois, 358 U.S.
307 (1959). However, the practice mentioned in the text above would involve double hearsay.
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TABLE 12
Track Record Measured by Arrests
40-

30,

20-

10
C

a.

0

0

NotGcved

2

3

4

5

6

7

9

10 12

13 15 16 20

25 30 40

44 50

Number of Previous Arrests Based on Cis Tips

Curiously, none of the affidavits reported that the arrests had led to any
convictions. This would be understandable if the CI had been known for just
a short time. However, considering that 40% of the CIs were reportedly
known for more that one year, the absence of any mention of convictions
was puzzling. It appears, however, that this information is not requested by
the computer program which is used to construct the search warrant and
affidavit in many cases. This program, which can be used to design a search
warrant and supporting affidavit for over 200 crimes, structures the affidavit
through the use of boiler plate language with blanks to be filled in. Thus,
only the information requested in this pre-packaged format will normally be
provided by the officer.
The use of boilerplate language in affidavits was also observed in the
study conducted by the National Center for State Courts which commented:
It is easy to imagine how a magistrate, seeing the same recitation over and
over, can be tempted to skim over these important pieces of evidence ....
But the question of their truthflness is far more critical. This latter
concern is more than argumentative, for it seems that one of the more
insidious qualities of boilerplate presentations is that the affiant (officer)
may take them only half-seriously, as part
pe of the game that must be
played, as form rather than substance.

55. SeeTHESEARCH WARRANTPROCESS, supranote 5, at 52-3.
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C. CORROBORATION OFCONFDEIIALINFORMANTS' Tips

Fortunately, the significant problems in assessing the reliability of CIs
based on a mind numbing recitation of pre-packaged boilerplate, were
largely countered in San Diego by an unexpected finding. This concerned
the extent to which informants' tips were corroborated by conducting a
controlled buy.56 The National Center for State Courts study, while
mentioning this practice, did not indicate its widespread use.5 7 In fact, that
study reported that in thirty percent of its nationwide sample, no effort of
58
any kind was undertaken to corroborate the accuracy of a Cl's information.
By contrast in our San Diego sample, a controlled buy was conducted by the
CI or an undercover police officer in the overwhelming majority (95.6%) of
cases in which a CI was the only significant source of information.59 The
56. A "controlled buy" describes a police procedure in which narcotics are purchased
from the location which will be the target of the search warrant The informant is first
searched to ensure he does not have contraband already in his possession. He is then given
money to make the purchase. The informant is then continuously kept under surveillance by
police until he enters the premises to be searched. After the informant exits the building he
again is kept under surveillance until he meets the police officer some distance away and
surrenders the narcotics which were purchased. The informant is again at this time searched
for money and contraband.
57. See Tnm SEARCHlWARRANTPRocESS, supra note 5, at 45, n.17.
58. See id. at 34, tbl. 16.
59. It should perhaps be noted, however, that even here the description of the controlled
buy contained in the affidavit is primarily boilerplate. The following language was common
with only minor variations:
Within the past 10 days, I conducted a controlled buy at the described premises. CI
was searched for money and contraband with negative results. CI was then
provided with a certain amount of money, and surveillance was maintained as CI
went to the above described premises. SDPD detectives saw CI approach the
premises and walk up to the front door.
After a short period of time, CI was seen leaving said premises and met with me at
a location away from the premises. There CI gave me a quantity of loose wafers,
which appeared to me to be consistent with cocaine base. CI was searched again
for money and contraband and neither was found. CI was continually watched by
officers, except for the time period CI was inside said premises during the
controlled buy.
CI told me that when CI went inside the premises, CI contacted the above
described person, who CI said appeared to be an occupant of the described
premises, based on the fact that the described person allowed him access to the
house, paid said person the funds I gave CI and in return received thepackage(s)
which CI gave to me. CI indicated the person represented the substance contained
within the package(s)to be cocaine base. (emphasis added)
The tell tale reference to '!package(s)" which was found repeatedly in other affidavits
reveals the boilerplate origins of this passage. The search warrant this passage was taken from
(#23819) authorized the search of a home in which an unnamed 'ispanic female,
approximately 18-19 years old ... [was] believed to be residing." The affidavit consisted
almost entirely of boilerplate and conclusions based only upon the officer's training and
experience in drug enforcement which was "about 15 months." Only the Cl's bare accusation
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majority of these cases were handled by the San Diego Police Departments
Narcotics Section. However, controlled buys were done across the board by
all agencies, when atip by a CI was the only source of probable cause. This
was also true with respect to anonymous tips. No search warrant issued by
the judges in the San Diego Judicial District relied solely upon an
anonymous tip. In almost three fourths of the anonymous tip cases (72%) the
tip was confirmed by having a CI conduct a controlled buy at the suspected
premises. Altogether controlled buys were done in almost two thirds (66%)
of all search warrant applications. Other methods of corroboration included
surveillance of the suspect premises and background investigation of people
a substantial or
living there. As Table 13 indicates in over 80% of the cases
60
fairly substantial investigation was conducted by police.

TABLE 13
Extent Of Investigation Conducted

60

40

20

0
Substantial

Moderate

Minimal
Fairly Minimal

Fairly Substantial

("Within the past 10 days, CI told me that rock cocaine was being sold at the described
premises by the descnbed suspect.") and the controlled buy, as described in the above quoted
passage, furnished the grounds for probable cause. No other police investigation was done.
When the search warrant was executed, no drugs were found and nothing whatsoever was
seized.
60. This determination was made by assessing the police investigation reported in the
affidavit on a five point scale; zero indicaling nothing was done and five indicating
substantial investigation was done. While this assessment is admittedly somewhat subjective,
there was one objective indicator which undoubtedly also contributed to the uniformly high
rating: a case involving a controlled buy was automatically given the highest mark.
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XI. EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
Under California law a search warrant must be served within ten days of
issuance or it is void.6 1 Normally a search warrant must be executed between
the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. 62 Upon a showing of good cause the
judge may authorize the search warrant to be served at any time day or
night. 63 Only ten (8.2%) of the search warrants in our sample authorized
service after 10:00 p.m. The majority (60%) of those were telephonic
warrants.64 As Table 14 reveals most search warrants (62.7%) were executed
between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Approximately 22% were executed
between 5:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., while about 15% were executed after 9:00
p.m.
TABLE 14
Time Search Warrant Executed
12:01 a.m. -8:59 a.m.
9:01 p.m. - 1200 a.m. \

O0a.

- 12 noon

)

5:01 P.M

p m - 500 pm.

The number of narcotics search warrants issued each month remained
fairly constant with March having a high of 25 and June having a low of 17.
An examination of the Clerk's Search Warrant Log disclosed a similar
61. See CAL.

PENAL CODE

§ 1534 (West 2000). We discovered one search warrant which

was served more than ten days after issuance.
62. See CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1533 (West 2000).
63. See id.
64. The majority of the telephonic warrants (57.1%), however, were served during the
regular statutorily authorized hours.
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pattern of relatively even monthly distribution for all search warrants issued
during the first six months of 1998. Table 15 shows the monthly distribution
of the search warrants in our sample. The fact that roughly the same number
of search warrants are issued each month indicates that the processing of
search warrants is steady and non-cyclical in nature and may be sensitive to
the allocation of criminal justice resources. As noted in Section III, the
perception that only a few judges are readily available to handle search
warrants may have contributed to the tendency to channel the workload to a
disproportionately small number of judges. If that perception were to
change, the workload might be more evenly distributed.
TABLE 15
DISTRIBUTION OF WARRANTS BY MONTH
JANUARY
FEBRUARY
MARCH
APRIL
MAY
JUNE

21
21
25
19
19
17

As Table 16 indicates, only three out of four of the narcotics warrants
in our sample were ultimately executed. Considering the expenditure of
time and energy necessary to obtain a search warrant as well as the
expenditure of judicial and prosecutorial resources, the discovery that one
quarter of the search warrants issued were never executed was surprising.
We were told that the failure to execute a search warrant could result from
many causes. As one officer speculated, the target of the search might move
his or her operations to another location, or be arrested on other charges.
Because the search warrants in our sample were issued in 1998, a follow up
study involving more current warrants would have to be undertaken to
accurately assess the reasons for the failure to execute search warrants.
Nevertheless, our data did show an apparent correlation between nonexecution and the use of confidential informants. While CI's were involved
in 63.9% of all search warrants studied, they accounted for 95% of the
search warrants which were not executed. 6
65. When a search warrant is executed the officer is required to return the search warrant

together with in inventory of the items seized to the magistrate. See CAL.PENAL CODE § 1537.
This is referred to as the "return." If a search warrant is not executed, most officers return the
search warrant to the Clerk of the Court and write "not executed" either on the face of the
warrant or on the Receipt and Inventory Form. Written notations on the Clerk's search
warrant log documented that 18% of the warrants were never executed. In 7% of the cases,
however, no return was ever filed. It is therefore not known for certain whether those search
warrants were not executed or whether they were executed, but nothing was seized.
66. Similarly, all but one of the cases in which no return on the search warrant was filed
were CI cases. See supra note 65.
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TABLE 16

Percent of All Search Warrants Executed
No Return Fie-

The percentage of search warrants issued each month which were
executed was fairly consistent except for two months which were below the
norm, as indicated by Table 17.

TABLE l7r
Percent of Search Warrants Issued
Which wereExecuted: by Month
81%
January
February
61.9%
March
84%

April

79%

May
June

79%
59%

67. The figures in Table 17 were obtained by separately examining the search
warrants issued each month to see if they had been executed.
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As Table 18 shows however the number of search warrants
actually executed each Month (witfiout regard to date of issue) varied
more significantly.
TABLE 19
NumberofSearchWanants

Executed Each Month
(as a percent of total)
January
12%
February
19%
March
21%
April
17%
May
17%
June
12%
N=90
Total is less than 100% due to rounding

XlI. RESULTS OF EXECuTED SEARCHWARRANTS
Based upon an examination of the Receipt and Inventory Form filed
with the return of the executed search warrants, the results of each search
were catalogued using several different measures. For each executed search
it was recorded whether the primary target of the search was recovered;
whether other non-primary items specified in the search warrant were seized;
whether items showing dominion and control were seized; and whether other
items, not specified in the search warrant, were seized.6s Although some
item was seized in the vast majority of searches, the primary target of the
search was recovered in less than half (48.4%) of all search warrants issued.
As Table 19 reveals, this is due in part to the fact that almost a quarter of the
search warrants issued (24.6%) were never executed.

68. An object was considered a primary target if it was specified in the search warrant
and was one of the motivations for getting the search warrant. A search wanant could have
several primary targets. All drags specified in a search warrant were considered primary
targets. However, search warrants routinely contained a laundry list of other objects such as
drug paraphernalia, packaging materials, weighing devices, etc. These items were not
considered the primary target of the search and were cataloged as non-primary specified
items. Search warrants also routinely authorized the seizure of items showing dominion and
control over the premises and seizure of these items were recorded as a separate category.
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TABLE 1969

Was a Primary Target Recovered
(percent of al search warrants)

Looking only at executed search warrants, 65% resulted in recovery of
the primary target sought. 70 Other non-primary target items specified in the
search warrant (such as paraphernalia or currency) were seized in 18% of the
executed search warrants.7 1 In 5% of the cases the only things seized were
items which were not specified in the search warrant. These cases involved
the seizure of either marijuana or non-contraband items. Adding such
inadvertent drug discoveries together with the number of primary drug
targets recovered, some drug was recovered in 73.9% of the cases where the
search warrant was executed. Table 20 shows the percentage of executed

69. See supranote 68.
70. Executed search wanrants were recorded as having recovered their primary target if
any amount of the drug was recovered or even if narcotics residue was found on
paraphernalia-

71. In over half (58%) of these cases marijuana or some other drug was found even
though the primary target drug was not recovered.
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warrants which resulted in the seizure of a primary target, only a nonprimary target, 72 only unspecified items, or no seizure at all.
TABLE 20

Results of Executed Warrants

A. TYPE OFDRUGS SEIZED

Table 21, on page 251, shows the type of drugs seized as primary
targets. The most frequent drug recovered as a primary target was
methamphetamine. 73 Marijuana and rock cocaine were the next most
frequent drugs seized. Very little heroin or powder cocaine was seized. In
one case, Vicodin, a prescription drug was seized. There were no seizures of
LSD or PCP reported in our sample.

72. In this group of cases no primary target was recovered, but some item specified in
the search warrant, usually drug paraphernalia, was seized.
73. Methamphetamine was also one of the drugs recovered in all of the multiple drug
seizures shown in Table 21.
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Type of Drugs Seized as Primary Targets
Multiple Drugs =2%

-Methamphetamine
Rock Cocaine -

Powder Cocaine=1 %

Marijuana

TAB3LE 22
Percent of Searches Successful:
By Type f Drug Sought
Marijuana
85.7%
n=7
Methaniphetaniine
63.2%
n=38
Heroin
44.0%
n-9
Powder Cocaine
33.0%
n=6
Rock Cocaine
27.9%
n=43
Other Drags
25.0%
n=4
Table 22 reflects the success rate by type of drug, indicating the percentage
of cases in which a recovery was made when that drug was the primary
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target. 74 As can be seen, the success rate varied widely, with searches for
rock cocaine being the least successful (27.9%) and searches for marijuana
the most successful (85.7%). 75
B. DRUG DETECTORDOGS
Because searches based on drug detector dogs involved multiple drugs,
they were tracked separately.76 The success rate for searches based upon
canine sniffs was extremely good (91.7%).77 All of these cases involved
seizures of marijuana and in one case both marijuana and
methamphetamine.7' These cases also produced the highest recorded yields,
with one case netting 53 pounds of marijuana. 79 The majority (75%) of these
searches involved packages.
As previously noted, in a number of cases other drugs in addition to or
instead of the primary target drug were discovered during the search. These
drugs were not specified in the search warrant. Most of these seizures
involved marijuana. Indeed, over half of all the marijuana seized was the
result of such inadvertent discovery. When these fortuitous seizures are
added together with the seizures of primary target drugs, marijuana becomes
the most frequently seized drug.
Table 23, on page 253, shows the percentage of all successful searches
represented by each type of drug.

74. These figures exclude cases in which multiple drugs were sought. Almost always

those cases were based upon an alert by a drug detector dog. Since the dog was trained to alert
to the presence of as many as five different drugs, the search warrant sought multiple drugs.
Dog sniff cases are reported separately. See supra text accompanying notes 26 and 27.
75. The figures with respect to heroin and powder cocaine should be viewed with caution
since very few search warrants actually sought these particular drugs.
76. See supranote 74.
77. This figure excludes one case in which no retum was filed.
78. These cases were not included in determining the success rate of searches for

marijuana reported in table 22.
79. Because the quantity of drugs seized was not uniformly recorded on the Receipt and
Inventory Form, we were not able to determine the total amount of each drug seized. For
example a typical entry would read simply "plastic baggie w/white powder found in...." In

tvo of the detector dogs cases, however, the amount of marijuana seized was specified. The
second case resulted in a seizure of 13 pounds of marijuana.
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TABLE 23

Total Drugs Seized
Other Drug

Powder Cocaine
7%

C. SEIZURE OFOTHER ITtES
In over two-thirds of all executed warrants (67.4%) police seized items
which had been specified in the search warrant, but which were not
considered primary targets.80 The overwhelming majority of these seizures
involved drug paraphernalia (82.3%).81 Currency was also seized in well
over half (62%) of all searches. Currency was often specified as an item to
be seized in the search warrant. 82 Where a primary drug target was
80. In 18% of the executed warrants the only thing seized was such non-primary
specified items. The figure in the text refers to the percentage of executed search warrants in

which an item specified in the search warrant was seized other than a primary target or an
item showing dominion and control.
81. Paraphernalia was defined as anything used to process, package, weigh or ingest the
drug in question and included objects of every description, ranging from plastic baggies, razor
blades and scales, to bongs and pipes used for smoking marijuana or crack cocaine.
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recovered, currency was also seized 69.5% of the time. Currency was also
frequently seized when only a non-primary target such as paraphernalia was
discovered. 83
D. EVIDENCE OFDOMINION & CONTROL
Evidence of dominion and control over the premises was another
category of items to be seized which was almost always specified in the
search warrant.8 4 The boilerplate language used in most search warrants
typically authorized seizure of "all papers, documents, and effects which

tend to show possession, dominion and control over said premises, including
fingerprints, handwritings, clothing and objects bearing a form of
identification such as a person's name, photograph, Social Security number
or driver's license number." While the seizure of such items appears to be
accepted practice, the fact that all narcotics search warrants specifically
authorize a search for such a broad category of items has the effect of giving
such search warrants virtually unlimited scope.8 5 This pennits a substantial

invasion of privacy. It was also observed that items of"D & C" were
sometimes seized even when no contraband at all was found.86

82. The justification for seizing currency is presumably based upon the theory that there
was probable cause to believe that the money was subject to forfeiture as proceeds from
illegal activity.
83. Only about half of these seizures were specifically authorized by the search warrant.
The remaining seizures of currency would presumably be justified under the plain view
doctrine which permits seizure of contraband and other criminally connected items which
lawfully come into view during a properly conducted search. See Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128 (1990). See also supra note 82.
84. If drugs are found they must be linked to a particular defendant Therefore bills,
letters, and other papers providing personal identification which are found in the room where
the contraband is located can be used as evidence to establish that person's possession of the
drugs.
85. Where the defendant is the sole owner or tenant in possession of the premises and
where there has previously been a controlled buy involving the defendant there may be little
need for such evidence, The authorization to search for and seize items of dominion and
control in such cases thus simply serves to authorize an arguably unnecessary fishing
expedition with no meaningful control on discretion regarding the scope of the search or the
amount of items which may be seized. See Central Art Galleries v. United States, 875 F2d
747 (1989). For example in a number of cases, unspecified photographs were seized without
any indication being given that they were a form of identification.
86. One such case arose from a traffic stop. The officer discovered a pipe used to smoke
methamphetamine in a bag, after receiving consent to search the bag. The defendant was then
arrested and searched and methamphetamine was found on his person along with a pager. A
telephonic search warrant was then obtained for his house, but no drugs were found. The only
item seized as a result of the search warrant was a piece of mail addressed to defendant. This
was one of several cases in which items apparently showing only dominion and control over
the premises were taken even though no contraband was seized in the placed searched. It
would seem that absent probable cause to believe such items had independent evidentiary
significance, such seizures would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment since items
showing dominion and control are relevant only to link one to the possession of contraband
found in the premises searched.
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In a substantial majority of searches (71.7%) at least one item was
seized as evidence of dominion and control. In about one third of the cases
(30.4%), multiple items were seized. In 26.1% of the searches these items
were described only as "D & C." This vague description would appear to
violate §1535 of the California Penal Code, which requires that the officer
give a receipt "specifying ...in detail" the property taken. The most
frequently taken items were financial and legal documents (26.1%), bills
(17.4%), items of personal identification, such as a driver's license or social
security card (16.3%), and letters or other papers (15.2%).8"
E SEiZURE OF WEAPONS
According to standard folklore, "In the narcotics business, 'firearms
are ... tools of the trade."' 89 Echoing that folklore, boilerplate language in
affidavits for narcotics search warrants asserts that the officer's'training and
experience indicate that persons dealing in controlled substances trafficking
frequently arm themselves with firearms .. .. "90 However, the United States
87. CAL. PENALCODE §1535 (West2000).
88. The percentages reflect the percent of all searches in which such items were seized.
89. See Ybarra v Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 106 (1980) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting (citing
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45,62 (1977)).
90. The full boilerplate passage reads as follows:
Furthermore, my training and experience indicate that person dealing in controlled
substance trafficking frequently arm themselves with firearms and ammunition,
and will keep them available either in their premises, in their vehicles or on their
person. This phenomenon is primarily due to the large amounts of cash or valuable
contraband involved in trafficking, and the fact that people so involved more and
more commonly resort to violence to resist robbery, settle disputes, or thwart
capture by law enforcement. The presence of firearms, along with the other
described property, will tend to circumstantially establish sales and provide a basis
for charging a violation of Penal Code Section 12022(a).
The section of the California Penal Code referred to provides an enhanced penalty of one
year when a person is "armed with a firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a
felony ....CAL.PENAL CODE § 12022(a) (West 2000). This section was interpreted by the
California Supreme Court to apply whenever a defendant has a specified weapon "available
for use." People v. Bland 10 Cal. 4th 991, 997 (1995);see also People v. Gray, 71 Cal. Rptr.
2d 383 (1998) (holding that there was a sufficient "facilitative nexus" between a loaded
revolver found near defendant's bed and drugs stored in a detached garage 20 to 30 yards
away).
However, in interpreting a similar federal enhancement provision involving the use of a
firearm, (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)) Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous United States
Supreme Court rejected the "facilitative nexus" approach on the ground that it created "an
impossible line-drawing problem" and was not "reasonably distinguishable from [mere]
possession." Bailey. v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 149 (1995). Justice O'Connor therefore
held that for the enhancement provision to apply the evidence had to show "active
employment" of a firearm in the commission of the substantive offense.See id. The Supreme
Court's interpretation of a federal statutory counterpart to CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022(a) is of
course not binding on the California Supreme Court when interpreting state law.
Nevertheless, the reasoning in Bland, decided beforeBailey, is less than persuasive in view of
the unanimous opinion by the high court. If Justice O'Connor's view is correct that merely
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Supreme Court, in striking down a blanket"narcotics case" exception to the
Fourth Amendment's 'knock-notice' requirement in Richards v.
Wisconsin,91 characterized this same assertion as a "considerable
overgeneralization" which provides neither probable cause nor reasonable
suspicion to believe that an officer may be endangered by weapons during a
search for narcotics. 92 Probable cause, of course, cannot be established
9 3 by
broad generalities, but must be based upon particularized justification. 1n
the absence of facts supporting the application of the generalization to the
particular case, it may therefore be questionable whether the boilerplate
language alone establishes probable cause to believe weapons are at the
premises to be searched. No facts are normally given in the affidavit to
suggest that the particular suspect is known to have a weapon, nor does the
officer even assert a belief that weapons will be found.
Our study found that firearms were discovered in only 14.1% of all
searches. Handguns 94 were discovered in eight cases, and shotguns were
discovered in four cases. This figure also includes one case in which both a
stun gun and BB gun were seized. 95 Thus the generalization asserted in the
boilerplate language used in narcotics affidavits appears to be incorrect
85.9% of the time. This should not be understood to imply that the execution
of a search warrant for narcotics does not entail a significant risk of danger
to police officers. That risk is of course always present and very real. These
findings do indicate, however, that the number of times firearms are actually
present in a home subject to a narcotics search warrant is substantially less
than common folklore suggests and confirms the wisdom of the Supreme
Court's decision in Richardsnot to permit a blanket exception to the knocknotice requirement in narcotics cases.
storing a firearm in the vicinity of controlled substances is not a proper ground for enhancing
the penalty for the drug offense, then the basis for seizing a weapon during a search in which
narcotics are found becomes more problematic absent probable cause to believe the weapon is
unregistered or otherwise illegally possessed, as would be the case, for example, if it was

known that the defendant had a prior felony conviction.
91. 520 U.S. 385 (1997). The Fourth Amendment incorporates the common law
requirement that police executing a search warrant must knock on the door of a home and
announce their identity and purpose before making a forcible entry.See Wilson v. Arkansas,
514 U.S. 927, 929 (1996).
92. Richards,520 U.S. at 393. InRichards,the Court held that in order for an exception

to apply, officers must have reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their
presence would be dangerous, futile or would frustrate the purpose of the search.See id. The
issue here, however, is whether the affidavit provides probable cause to believe firearms are
present in the premises to be searched.
93. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91 (holding that individualized justification was required to
search a person on the premises being searched pursuant to a search warrant, stating: "Where

the standard is probable cause, a search or seizure of a person must be supported by probable
cause particularized with respect to that person").

94. This figure includes cases in which the officer only recorded the weapon as a "gunf
on the Receipt and Inventory form without further identification or comment
95. In one case a billy club was found. In several cases (7.6%) unspecified ammunition
was seized although no weapon was found.
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F SEIZURE OFMISCELLANEOUS UNSPECIFIEDITEMS

In over half (53%) of all searches, a wide variety of other items not
specified in the search warrant were also seized. Pagers and cellular
telephones were among the most frequent items taken.96 Other items
included personal effects such as a bicycle, key ring, calculator, key for safe
deposit box, VCRtapes, and a camera and film. 97
XIII. FEEDBACK AND OVERSIGHT

Under the statutory scheme, a judge in theory receives feedback on the
results of a search warrant he or she has issued when the officer returns the
search warrant together with an inventory of the items seized. The California
Penal Code requires that the search warrant be served by the officer named
in the warrant "but by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his
requiring it, he being present and acting in its execution."9 Following the
execution of the search warrant the officer completes a Receipt and
Inventory Form detailing the property taken. The search warrant is then
returned to the magistrate together with an inventory of the property taken,
and the officer swears before the magistrate that the inventory is atrue and
detailed account" of all property taken.99The majority (95%) of the search
warrants were returned by the officer who executed them. Normally the
issuing judge signs the attestation on the Receipt and Inventory Form.
However over a third (37%) of these forms were signed by a judge other
than the issuing magistrate. While it is not required by statute that the
warrant be returned to the same judge who issued the warrant, to the extent
this practice becomes prevalent it deprives judges of feedback on the
outcome of search warrants they issue. As a former California Attorney
General has pointed out: "Return of the warrant and inventory required by
96. Search warrants also routinely authorize the officer "to intercept all incoming phone
calls to said premises while the warrant is being executed." While the practice of intercepting

telephone calls has been upheld when large amounts of drugs have been discovered during a
search or other specific information gives probable cause to believe that incoming telephone
calls will concern criminal activity involving narcotics, See People v. Sandoval, 65 Cal. 2d
303 (1966); People v. Vanvalkenburgh, 145 Cal. App. 3d 163 (1983), the idea that the right to
search a premises for drugs automatically includes the right to intercept all incoming

telephone calls has been rejected by at least one court. See People v. Harwood, 74 Cal. App.
3d 460 (1977); see also Berger v. NewYork, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).

97. While it is understandable that the police might want to collect photographic
evidence of friends and acquaintances of a person who sells drugs, the legal basis for seizing
cameras and film is less than clear in the absence of probable cause to believe there are events
connected to drug trafficking activity captured on film. Developing the film and vievng the
pictures would in any event appear to require a warrant, as would viewing any VCR tapes
seized, as these were not specified items. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980).
98. CAL. PENALCODE § 1530 (West2000).
99. CAL. PneAL CODE § 1537 (West 2000). The warrant, however, may be made
returnable before either the issuing magistrate or his or her court.See CAL. PENAL CODE §
1534(c) (West 2000).
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Penal Code section 1537 allows the magistrate to compare the seized articles
with the warrant he has issued and to return property that is 'not the same as
that described in the warrant' under Penal Code section 1540. " loo
Although a citizen has a statutory remedy for obtaining the return of
property wrongfully seized, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held that notice
of the existence of such procedures is not required. 10' Therefore in those
cases where no charges are brought, judicial review of the Receipt and
Inventory Form may be the only protection realistically available to insure
that the items seized were within the proper scope of the warrant issued.
XIV. IMPACT OF DELAY IN EXECuTiNG THE SEARCHWARRANT
Perhaps the most surprising finding arising out of our study was the
discovery that a significant number of search warrants were not executed
until almost a week or more had passed after their issuance. Table 24
indicates how many days after issuance the search warrants in our sample
were executed. Less than a third (31.1%) were executed on the same day the
search warrant was issued. More than four out often (43.3%) were executed
five days or more after being issued. Over one quarter (27.8%) were
executed seven days or more after issuance. We found one search warrant
which was executed after the ten day statutory time period had expired. 2
As Table 25 reveals, we found that there was a significant relationshi
between the success rate and the time the search warrant was executed.
Where the search warrant was executed on the same day it was issued the
success rate in recovering the primary target sought was 85.7%. By contrast,
when the warrant was executed on the ninth day the success rate was only
33.3%. We found that five days marked the most significant dividing line
between success and failure. If the search warrant was executed less than
five days after issuance, there was still an 80.4% success rate. However, if
execution was delayed five days or more, the rate of success dropped
dramatically. More than half (56.4%) of the search warrants executed five
days or more after being issued failed to recover their primary target.
100. Evelle J. Younger, Search and Seizure: A Statement ofThe CurrentPrinciplesand
TheirApplication,Office of the Attorney General, State of California, 53 (1972). Penal Code
section 1540 provides that 'f it appears that the property taken is not the same as that
described in the warrant... the magistrate must cause it to be restored to the person from

whom it was taken. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1540 (West 2000).
101.

City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234 (1999).See

(WEST2000)

CAL. PENAL CODE

§§ 1536 and 1540 which have been held to establish adeqate post-deprivation

remedies. See Perkins v City of West Covina, 113 F.3d.1004, 1011 (9m Cir. 1997).See also

CAL. PENAL CODE §1538.5 which establishes the procedure under which a criminal defendant
may, by written motion, seek the return of property taken.
102. After the expiration often days the search wanant is void. See CAL. PENAL CODE §
1534 (West 2000). In following up this case we discovered that no motion to suppress was
filed, Both defendants were illegal immigrants who pled guilty.
103. Chi-square (df 1) = 9.931, p<.002; n = 58.
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TABLE 24
HOW MANY DAYS AFTER ISSUANCE
WAS SEARCH WARRANT EXECUTED?

TABLE 25
IMPACT OF DELAY ON SUCCESS RATE
PERCENT SUCCESSFUL
Chi-square= 9.931, p<.002

Less Than 5 Days

5 Days or More

Delay In Executing Search Warrant
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The effect of delay remained significant in cases involving a CI. Where the
search warrant was executed in less than five days, there was a successful
recovery in 82.4% of the cases involving a CI, while over half (53.1%) of
the CI search warrants executed 5 days or more after being issued failed to
recover their primary target.'04 The same relationship held in cases involving
a controlled buy. Again 78.6% of those (controlled buy) search warrants
which were promptly executed were successful while over half (51.6%) of
those delayed five days or more were unsuccessfull °5
The impact of delay was also was seen to have a similar effect on the
success rate of search warrants when controlling for the issuing judge. Table
26 shows the overall success rate for search warrants approved by the six
judges who most frequently issue narcotics search warrants, without regard
to delay. Table 27 then shows the improved rate of success for all but two
judges where the search warrant was executed less than five days after being
issued. These findings reveal that the assumption that judge shopping is bad
is not necessarily always correct. Of the six judges who most frequently
issued narcotics search warrants, the judge who had the highest success rate
was a former police officer and prosecutor. The search warrants issued by
this judge were successful in recovering their primary target 80% of the time
overall. The success rate was 100% where the search warrant was executed
in less than five days. In fact, four of the six judges who frequently issued
were
narcotics warrants had a high rate of success when the search warrants
6
executed promptly. Each of these judges was a former prosecutor0
We also made an attempt to assess the impact of delay with respect to
each type of drug. The number of cases involving heroin and powder
cocaine were too small to do an analysis and all of the marijuana search
warrants were executed in less than five days so a comparison was not
possible. A majority (68.2%) of the search warrants for methainphetamine
were executed in less than five days and had a success rate of 63%. Delay in
execution of the search warrant appeared to have the greatest impact on
search warrants for rock cocaine. The success rate for rock cocaine searches
was the lowest of all major drugs. Only about one out of four search
warrants issued for rock cocaine was ultimately successful. This was due in
part to the fact that over a third (37.2%) of these search warrants were never

104. Chi-square (df 1)= 5.785,p<.016; n= 49.
105. Chi-square (df 1)= 3.602, p< .058; n =45.
106. The two judges for whom delay did not have an impact had the lowest overall
success rates of the six judges. For example, 50% of the executed search wan-ants issued by

one judge failed to recover a primary target. That ratio remained the same even when

execution occurred in less than five days. However, it is difficult to assess the impact of delay
in that particular case because so few search warrants by that judge were promptly executed.

The overwhelming majority (85.7%) of that judge's search warrants were executed five days
or more after being issued.
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TABLE 26
Success Rate of Judges Who Most
Frequently Issue Narcotics Warrants
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executed. However, only 40.7% of those search warrants which were
executed were successful. The majority (59%) of the search warrants for
rock cocaine were executed five days or more after being issued. Table 28
shows there was a significant relationship between the timing of execution
and the failure rate of search warrants for rock cocaine. Less than one in five
(18.8%) were successful in recovering rock cocaine if served five days or
more after being issued. The failure rate was thus over 80%.

TABLE 28107

EFFECT OF DELAY ON FAILURE RATE
ROCK COCAINE

Chi=square = 6.250, p<.012

Less Than 5 Days

5 Days or More

PERCENT NOT SUCCESSFUL

107. Chi-square (df 1 ) = 6.250, p<.012; n = 16. This table is based upon the number of
executed search warrants seeking rock cocaine which failed to find any rock cocaine. It
excludes cases in which detector dogs were used since this would have skewed the data to

present an even higher failure rate. See supra note 74.
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XV. TELEPHONIC SEARCH WARRANTS

Section 1526 of the California Penal Code establishes a special
procedure whereby an officer in the field can obtain verbal authorization
from a judge to conduct a search. This is known as a telephonic search
warrant because the judge swears the officer under oath by telephone 08 The
officer can make an oral statement of the grounds (probable cause) for the
search or fax or e-mail a written affidavit to the judge, along with a
proposed search warrant. If approved, the search warrAnt is signed by the
judge and faxed (or e-mailed) back to the officer who is then authorized by
telephone to mark "duplicate original" on the officer's copy. It is thus
possible for an officer in a squad car equipped with a lap top computer and
fax-modem to obtain a search warrant while remaining in the field.
We were surprised to learn that only 11.5% of the search warrants in our
sample were telephonic warrants 1t 0 Apparently they are used only in the
evening after regular court hours or in case of an emergency during the day.
Only five telephonic warrants were issued between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.
Half of the telephonic search warrants were sought by law enforcement
agencies other than the San Diego Police Department. The majority were
sought in connection with the search of a home. They were used to search
for all types of drugs, the most frequent being methamphetamine. Probable
cause was usually based upon observation by law enforcement either alone
or in combination with information from an ordinary citizen. Only two cases
n
involved a CI. Almost all were executed the same day they were issued/,
Overall, telephonic warrants had a higher success rate than regular warrants.
The primary target was recovered 76.9% of the time.
XVI. CRIMINAL CASES RESULTING FROM EXECUTED SEARCH WARRANTS
Discovering whether the execution of a search warrant led to a criminal
prosecution is, as other researchers have noted, quite difficult 1 2 For

108. The officer seeking a telephonic warrant contacts the Duty Lieutenant who alerts a

Deputy District Attorney who is on call. The officer completes a special form describing the
place to be searched and the items to be seized. This serves as the field search warrant Ifthe
Deputy District Attorney approves, he or she then contacts the Marshall who sets up a three
way conference call between the officer, the Deputy District Attorney and a Judge. After
regular court hours, a judge is assigned to be on call for this duty on a rotating basis.

109. The oral statement is taped, later transcribed, approved by the judge and filed with
the Clerk of the Court in the same manner as an affidavit

110. N=14.
111. Only one telephonic search warrant was not executed. Two were executed within

one day after being issued.
112. See THE SEARCH WARANrr

PROCESS,

supra note 5, at 41. Although the search

warrant number would make an easy identifier, we were advised by the Deputy District
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example, the name of the person who was the target of the search warrant
appeared either in the affidavit, search warrant or return in only about half of
the executed search warrants in our sample. Using the criminal records database maintained by the Clerk of the Court, we were able to determine
whether criminal charges had been filed against these named individuals
after the date on which the search warrant was executed . 3 Records
discovered in this manner were then examined to determine if the criminal
case was linked in time and subject manner to search warrant. This research
revealed that a criminal charge was linked to an executed search warrant
to 45% of the named individuals who were targets of the
with respect
search 1 4
XVII. DIsposmoN: MOTIONS TO SUPPRESS AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
When narcotics charges were filed in connection with the execution of a
search warrant a conviction was obtained 100% of the time. These search
warrant convictions were also normally disposed of promptly. The average
time between arraignment and disposition was fifty-one days. The median
time was just thirty-four days. The reason for this quick disposition was
because in 100% of these cases the conviction was obtained by a guilty plea
rather than trial. Contrary to the popular mythology that the Fourth
Amendment lets guilty defendants off on technicalities, we found that only
three motions to exclude evidence for violations of the Fourth Amendment
were filed. None was granted. Prosecutions based upon search warrants thus
appear from this data to result in prompt and economical dispositions.
CONCLUSION
Our examination of the process in which narcotics search warrants were
obtained in the most urban of the four judicial districts in San Diego
revealed an efficient, streamlined process which, when successful in
recovering narcotics, resulted in swift conviction of narcotics traffickers with
a minimum expenditure of judicial resources. Despite the prevalent use of
confidential informants and anonymous tips, the fact that in the
overwhelming majority of these cases the tip was corroborated by
Attorney serving as Liason to the San Diego Police Department that this number was not
carried over into records kept regarding the prosecution of individuals.
113. We also checked to see if an arrest warrant had been issued for any of the named
individuals with negative results.
114. This is consistent with the findings reported inTas SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS,
supm note 5. As the authors there noted, however, this is necessarily an incomplete picture of
the total number of criminal cases which may have resulted. In our sample, for example, the
identity of individuals in control of the premises searched was unknown for almost half of the
executed warrants. There also could have been charges filed against others who were present

at the premises searched but who were not mentioned in the search warrant or affidavit
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conducting a controlled buy has removed many of the troublesome aspects
of relying upon such sources. The findings of this study thus indicate that the
judiciary has not abdicated its responsibility as guardian of the
Constitutional rights of all citizens to ensure that"no Warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause." Our study has, nevertheless, generated a number of
questions which require further research. Why are a significant number of
search warrants never executed? Why is there significant delay in executing
many search warrants? Why do so few search warrants target powder
cocaine, used by Whites, while so many target rock cocaine, used by
Blacks? Why are so few judges involved in the search warrant process and
why do the success rates among some judges vary so widely?
One of the most puzzling questions is also why the use of statutorily
authorized telephonic search warrant procedures has been so limited. We
believe that the expanded use of telephonic warrants would enhance the
efficiency of both the police and the judiciary. As we noted in the beginning
of this article, the Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Leon that a
magistrate's determination of probable cause is to be given great deference
by a reviewing appellate court and evidence will not be excluded even if the
magistrate erred, so long as the officer reasonably relied upon the
magistrate's determination." 5 It would therefore seem that one of the best
ways to ensure that an officer has reasonably relied upon the magistrate is to
make sure that the magistrate has been provided with all the facts rather than
just the mind-numbing verbiage embodied in the boilerplate of the typical
affidavit. From the judiciary's perspective we believe it would also be a
refreshing change for the officer to actually talk to the judge and explain his
or her grounds for probable cause in plain common-sense language. Guided
by a Deputy District Attorney who structures the sworn verbal statement
with a check list of questions, there is little danger such oral affidavits,
which are tape recorded and transcribed, will be found insufficient on any
technical ground. This method would also eliminate a potential source of
delay in the ultimate enecution of search warrants once probable cause is
obtained.
Our findings concerning the use of boilerplate also raises questions. In
Illinois v. Gates, the U.S. Supreme Court adopted a "totality of the
circumstances" test for determining probable cause, stating:"The task of the
issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances ...there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be
searched."" 6
Yet the increasing use of boilerplate in affidavits which we have
observed actually obscures the "totality of the circumstances" by denying the
magistrate any context in which to place the sanitized and prepackaged
115. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
116. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1984).
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generic boilerplate assertions. Indeed while boilerplate obviously has its
proper uses, excessive reliance upon such formalism is a relic of the old
hyper-technical approach to affidavits which Gates intended to overthrow.
The ease with which cookie cutter affidavits are now prepared using a
computer disk, and the extensive use of boilerplate throughout the affidavit,
also raise some concerns for the future. We have no doubt that few law
enforcement officers who submit affidavits for search warrants-, would
knowingly make false statements of fact under oath to a judge. We also have
little doubt, however, that if the search warrant process becomes a mere
ritual in which pre-packaged, boilerplated affidavits are produced by merely
filling in a few blanks, officers in the future may come to view the process as
merely a game, in which a verbal formula becomes more important than
actual fact. As one wise veteran officer observed:"
When shortcuts become
' 17
the norm, you start shortcutting the shortcut."
Our study showed that search warrants are rarely challenged in court by
the defense. Judges also will seldom have cause to question these standard
boilerplate statements. For example, when we asked one judge how it was
possible to know from the boilerplate language whether a proper controlled
buy had actually been conducted, the candid reply was: "You don't. You
have to trust the officer."118 Certainly trust in the integrity of our law
enforcement officers is necessary and is ordinarily well founded. But our
system of government was founded upon the belief that checks and balances
are also a necessary part of good governance. As President Ronald Reagan
once said in a different context, "Trust but verify." 119 As we have
unfortunately witnessed in the Ramparts scandal within the Los Angeles
Police Department, a system which creates easy avenues for abuse and
ceases to provide any meaningful check to control against that possibility,
tempts the few to engage in conduct which can tarnish the reputation of the
many who are unquestionably honest*12 It is therefore important that all
components of the criminal justice system- the prosecution, the defense bar
and the judiciary- remain vigilant to ensure that law enforcement's symbol
of authority remains a badge of integrity.
117. Interview with veteran officer, February 17,2000.
118. Interview with Judge #1, supra, note 23.
119. See Rick Horowitz, The Latest Craze-A RussianPhrase, Cm. Tam., Dec. 14,
1987, at 19.
120. According to transcripts of interviews conducted during an official investigation
into allegations of misconduct, Rafae Perez, former member of the anti-gang CRASH unit in

the Ramparts Division of the Los Angeles Police Department admitted that he and other
officers repeatedly manufactured probable cause. See Scott Glover & Matt Lait, Police in
Secret GroupBroke Law Routinely, TranscriptsSay, LA. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 2000, at Al. While

the "vast majority of police officers respect the individual rights of community members they
serve....Unfortunately, there are those police officers who tarnish all of our badges by their
behavior." Racial Profiling Issue; Hearing on S. 821 before the Senate Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights, 106 Cong.(2000)( Statement of John Welter,

Assistant Chief of Police, San Diego Police Department).
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